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ABSTRACT
Splitting Games: Nash Equilibrium and the Optimization Problem 
Ana Paula Martins 
This research states the stylised n (more than two) players’ splitting problem as a 
mathematical programme, relying on definitions of the values of the game and problem 
stationarity to generate tractable reduced forms, and derives the known solutions according to the 
properties of pertaining first-order conditions. On the one hand, boundary constraints are taken 
into consideration, required by the most general formulation possible with respect to the controls. 
On the other, distinction between FOC’s of optimizing behavior and equilibrium fitness is 
provided. Finally, the formal proof of the internal insufficiency of the usual approach to 
determine the equilibrium is advanced, and the imposing additional conditions – affecting cross 
multipliers - required for model solving forwarded and interpreted. 
Two different types of protocols (sets of rules of the game) were staged: alternate offers 
and synchronized ones. Perfect information (and foresight) of the players, infinite horizon, and 
offers exchange restricted to infinite-term settlements are always assumed. Each player makes a 
proposition of the division among the n participants. Periodic “outside” alternatives may differ 
according to whose offer is being analysed, and from those accruing to the players when none is 
forwarded.
The alternate offers protocol is a generalization of the Rubinstein’s structure. At each 
round of negotiations, one and only one player, exogenously determined, can make an – the – 
offer. An agent must conciliate – and solve consistently – as many optimization problems as 
eventual proponents there are in the game. 
The synchronized offers game is a generalization of Martins (2004, 2006), necessarily 
involving – mixed strategies - the definition and endogenous determination of the probability that 
each player makes an offer (or not). 
JEL Classification: C72; C78; C44; H56; D74; (D31). C61; C62. 
Keywords: Non-Cooperative N-Person Games. Infinite Horizon, Mixed Strategy 
Games; Mixed Strategies under Perfect Information Games; Simultaneous Sequential Bargaining; 
Matching Equilibrium under Sequential Bargaining; Synchronous (Decisions) Equilibrium under 
Sequential Bargaining. Mechanism Design; Bargaining Protocols. Dynamic Programming: 
Stationary Problems (without State Variables). 3
Splitting Games: Nash Equilibrium and the Optimization Problem 
“5 They divided them impartially by drawing lots, for there were officials of the 
sanctuary and officials of God among the descendants of both Eleazar and Ithamar.” In 1
Chronicles 24: 5. 
“31 They also cast lots, just as their brothers the descendants of Aaron did, in the 
presence of King David and of Zadok, Ahimelech, and the heads of families of the priests and of 
the Levites. The families of the oldest brother were treated the same as those of the youngest.” In 
1 Chronicles 24: 31. 
“8 Young and old alike, teacher as well as student, cast lots for their duties.” In 1
Chronicles 25: 8. 
“12 These divisions of the gatekeepers, through their chief men, had duties for 
ministering in the temple of the LORD, just as their relatives had. 13 Lots were cast for each gate, 
according to their families, young and old alike.” In 1 Chronicles 26: 12-13. 
Introduction 
Rubinstein’s (1982) structure has become a major reference in game theory and wage 
bargaining literature, possessing in its most well-known form the agreeable characteristic of 
generating – under perfect information, rational players with positive discount rates, and a 
realistic bargaining protocol – an immediate settlement and a unique equilibrium with no time 
loss, illustrating both the first-mover and patience advantages. Moreover, it provided, after 
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986), a rationale for the cooperative solution implied by the 
widely accepted Nash (1950, 1953) maximand. Martins (2006) 
1
 proposed generalizations of its 
infinite horizon solution to games involving more than two players. It is the purpose of this 
research to suggest the pertaining solutions as stemming from equilibrium of first-order 
conditions of conventional (quasi-)static optimization programmes. 
In all scenarios, at stake is the split of an infinite flow of benefits, periodically available 
at subsequent, equally distant, discrete points in time. For simplicity, it is assumed that only 
stationary divisions of the cake are contractually acceptable, and enforceable, once agreed upon, 
ad infinitum – a context akin to wage bargaining, but also realistic for other settings, namely 
1
 Where explicit solutions for linear felicity functions can also be found. 4
rental - tenancy and leasing – agreements, and barter of capital or durable goods. Each player 
makes a proposition on the division of the cake among all the players and only one proposal is 
heard each period; if refused, each agent enjoys in the period an exogenous alternative specific to 
the opponent making offers, and the bargaining re-initiates – continues… - next period. 
Firstly, we advance alternate offers protocols: at a player’s turn to “make a move”, he 
can chose not to make any, enjoying a pay-off different from the one he gets when refusing an 
offer
2
, and wait for next period’s decision of the opponent concerning the same choice. Only the 
player that is going to make the immediate offer – i.e., the first player at each point in time - is 
known, and each player except the one that is making the offer can end up making one with equal 
probability next period.  
We allow the players to decide whether to negotiate or not, and also to play mixed (i.e., 
random) strategies. These are known to exist for familiar bargaining games, even if not 
necessarily called for to assure equilibrium 
3
.
Simultaneous bargaining has been studied in the literature to obviate the dependence of 
Rubinstein’s results on the order and timing of offers. Usually, it is staged in a sequential set-up 
where time is assumed to be continuous and minimum delays between offers to exist - see Perry 
and Reny (1993) and Sákovics (1993). Instead, we keep the discrete time and forward the notion 
of “matching” or synchronous equilibrium, defined relying on each player using a mixed 
(probabilistic) strategy conditional on (and statistically independent of) the other player’s action – 
as in Martins (2004 and 2006). 
The individuals’ problems, even if dynamic in nature, exhibit an obvious stationarity: 
invariably, only a fixed number of alternative situations are (recurrently) possible at any point in 
time during the game (or while the game does not finish). This implies the existence of a static 
mathematical representation of the equilibrium - adjusted to account for the proponent’s rotation 
in the case of alternate offers. Individuals maximize the value of the game at each point in time, 
subject to – under a Nash perspective – the decisions that were/are/will be taken by opponents – 
and by himself with alternate offers; equilibrium derives from mutual agreement. Game theory 
does not usually resort to lagrangean methods – Khun-Tucker conditions… - and equilibrating 
constraints to generate solutions; we therefore inquire why, and if – in the reduced problems – 
some qualification of the usual conditions can generate the solutions proposed in the literature. 
The exposition proceeds as follows: notation is forwarded in section 1 and implications 
of solution stationarity for the dynamic programmes deducted in section 2. Alternate offers are 
staged in section 3: starting by the players’ problems, then deriving FOC and finally justifying the 
Nash equilibrium. In section 4, following the same steps, properties of simultaneous, yet 
sequential, equilibria are inspected. The exposition ends with some concluding remarks.  
2
 To some extent, this approaches the context of outside-option literature – such as Haller and Holden 
(1990) and Fernandez and Glazer (1991). 
3
 See Admati and Perry (1985), for example. 5
1. Notation 
4
. A “pie” of fixed size, normalized to 1, is made available to the n individuals every 
period; each player has per period utility function – a discrete, well-behaved, “felicity” function - 
ui(z), with z denoting the share obtained by i, which he discounts at factor i – maximizing 
accumulated discounted felicity. Unlike for other parameters, a superscript k on i, i.e., i
k,
denotes the k-th power (of i).














    =  1  ,   j = 1, 2, …, n 
Of course, protocols differ according to the allocation of j’s turn to make a proposition.  
Each player holds “veto” rights over an agreement – ruling out benefits from coalition-
seeking. A (therefore unanimous) agreement on the share of the pie accruing to each player is 
binding for eternity 5: if a settlement is reached about the split of the pie for a particular period, 
the same split will hold forever 6.
Also, when an individual, j, makes an offer – proposal –, either everybody accepts it and 










Or it is rejected – someone rejects it; in this case, the current pie is lost and di
j is the 
periodic felicity accruing to player i – di
j may be ui(0), or a better alternative exogenously 
available to him after rejecting j’s offer. si
j - ij - is the probability with which player i rejects j’s 
offer. 
4
 We mainly reproduce Martins’ (2006) notation. 
5 See Manzini (1998), for a survey of similar structures and results, including finite horizon games. Also, 
Busch and Wen (1995), Muthoo (1995) and Muthoo (1999). Yet, these contracts can sometimes be converted – 
see Martins (2004) – into a single “pie” division one. 
6 This condition/assumption restricts the relevant strategies to the players to be stationary in the long-
run.  6
di
i, the periodic alternative accruing to i if his offer is rejected, is always assumed a low-
value option, and enjoys a different status than di
j, ji. 
After a rejection, the “haggling” then reinitiates next period with the player making the 
offer being determined by the game protocol. 
. ri is the probability with which player i makes an offer when he is the one so appointed. 
Pure strategies with respect to it arise when players decide ri = 1. We assume a player gets di in 
the period if he does not make an offer, and that everyone else, ji, simultaneously gets dj – 
player i gets periodic felicity di if there is no offer exchange in the period. It may differ from the 
di
j’s for ji, and from di
i. Of course, for games in pure strategies, di is a bound, but it does not 
influence (fully…) interior solutions. For mixed strategies to emerge, di may not coincide with 
the periodic alternative available for player i outside the game (the latter may then have to be 
much lower for the solutions advanced in the text to hold)… 
With alternate offers, each period, one and only player is exogenously assigned the right 
to make (or not, but then time elapses without the game ending) the periodic offer. Vi
j is then 
going to denote the value of the game for player i at the point at which j is supposed to make an 
offer.  
With simultaneous offers, Vi is the value of the game for player i at the beginning of the 
game, as at any point in time while the game is running – has not finished in an infinite term 
settlement. 
2. Dynamic Optimization under Stationarity 
. Individuals’ problems are dynamic programming structures. We have no state 
variables, yet, decisions in one period affect others. Consider a simple (single-person, infinite 
horizon) problem such that one must decide xi
t, t = 1,2,…, which affects directly a function that i 
maximizes at time t, Vi
t = gi(xi
t, Vi
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t
(2.2)  s.t.:   Vi
t+k = gi(xi
t+k, Vi
t+k+1) ,    k = 0,1,2… 
and V i
t+k = Vi
t+k*   ,    k = 1,2… 
xi
t+k = xi
t+k*   ,    k = 1,2… 7
i.e., knowing that Vi
t+k and xi
t+k will be consistent with an optimal choice in those later 
periods. Given the stationarity of the problem, Vi
t+k* = Vi* and xi
t+k = xi* - whatever optimal at 
time t, will also be it at t+k and vice-versa -, which can therefore be replaced, simplifying the 
structure to: 
(2.3)    
; ii Vx Max    Vi
(2.4)  s.t.:  Vi  =  gi(xi, Vi)
We will resort to the argument to suggest simplifying maximands in both type of 
protocols. For synchronized offers, it will be sufficient to generate a consistent game between n 
players – whose problems interact, but where recurrence of optimal decisions is expected; with 
alternate offers, a further generalization – but in the same spirit –, isolating the n possible 
stationary states for each player, provides mathematical structures also easier to deal with. 
3. Alternate Offers 
3.1. The Player’s Problem 
. A player can either be appointed to make an offer in each period, or not. If he is and 
negotiations break-down, another of the n-1 players will take that role in the following round. 
If i is making the offer, he will solve the problem: 




























   Vi
i
 s.t.:     
(3.2) Vl

































































    =  1
 x l
i 	 0, l = 1,2,...,n;
 0    
  ri 
  1;  0 
  si
m 
 1, mi, m = 1,2,...,n 
  Given     rm, mi,  m = 1,2,…,n;  8
 x l
m, mi,  l,m = 1,2,…,n;
 s l
m, li,m,  l,m = 1,2,…,n. 
If player j is the one making a proposition, i solves: 




























   Vi
j
and he is subject to the same conditions. 
Given that the two positions intertwine, the same controls – and constraints – are 
present. And each player i solves n problems: maximizing Vi
j, for each j = 1,2,...,n. 
The fact that all the Vl
m’s appear as controls is instrumental – they show as controls but 
are constrained by their definitions, known to the players, stated in (3.2). On the one hand, the n 
equations defining Vi
m, m = 1,2,…,n, would allow a unique solution for Vi
j = g(…), where g has 
arguments other than the Vi
m’s – analogously to form (2.4). As now the own decisions affect 
other players, Vl
m’s, li must also be specified.
Independent optimization, with simultaneous decision of the same controls, is justified 
by a simple analog to the envelope theorem: we have that each Vi
j depends on control zl
i and on 
the optimal Vi
k’s, kj, k =1,2,…,n (as we will see, Vr
m for ri will not affect directly Vi
j). Then, 
when deciding at the point where an offer from j is being analyzed, i is maximizing the present 
value of the game, knowing that he will also optimize at later dates; he will program the (any at 
his disposal) control zl

















































































j denotes the appropriate Lagrangean of the problem 
associated directly to Vi
j). This implies that we could have stated the two problem controls as the 










































j for ji – but provided the 
resulting system would be sufficient for determination. 9
3.2. First-Order Conditions 
. Each player’s responses – strategies – are going to be consistent – i.e., they will be 
formed after the compatibilization of FOC of each of his n optimization programs. 
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j (1 - si
m)
 x l
i 	 0, l = 1,2,...,n;
 ( )i
j 	 0; (l
m)i
j 	 0, l,m = 1,2,...,n; 
 ( )i
j (1 - ri) = 0,  ri 	 0, ()i
j 	 0; 
 ( m)i
j (1 - si
m) = 0,  si
m 	 0, (m)i
j 	 0, mi, m = 1,2,...,n 
The optimand is linear in the controls. For a maximum, equality as inequality constraint 
devices – for application of Khun-Tucker conditions – are added to the constraints and embedded 
in the Lagrangean, constructed to exhibit non-negative multipliers – to obey SOC, that with a 




 Concavity of the definitions of Vl
m in the arguments – that requires concavity of felicity functions in 
pure strategies -, reason why in the Lagrangean their symmetric is in fact introduced: (if we replaced the 
definition of Vi
j in the maximand, it should be concave, and all the constraints of 
, including that of Vi
j if it 
were not an equality, convex, by Khun-Tucker sufficient second-order conditions.) Inequality constraints are 
linear and specified accordingly. SOC should hold for FOC to be valid for a maximum. 10
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. Looking at (3.5) and (3.6) separately, we observe that they form a system of nxn linear 
equations in the nxn (l
m)i
j’s, l,m = 1,2,….,n, and that (l
m)i
j = 0 for li would solve it. We can 
write the two equations as: 
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 We will concentrate on solutions with spontaneously positive values for these controls. 11
(3.12) (i
j)i
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 , ri or sj,
r,s = 1,2,...,n 
As the second equation holds for r=i if sj:
(3.14) (i
s)i





































 sj, s = 
1,2,...,n
Then, from (3.12): 
(3.15) (i
j)i
















] – 1 = (i
s)i
















]  sj, s = 
1,2,...,n
The right hand-side is constant for all s. Replacing then (i
s)i
j, sj, - after (3.15) - in 
(3.5):























































































]   
or
(3.17)   (i
j)i


































































































j for sj can then be inferred from (3.15). 
For any ri, from (3.13) we deduct that: 
(3.18) (r
s)i
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Replacing in (3.6): 
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]   , ri, r,s = 1,2,...,n 
Then, it solves for: 
(3.20) (r
s)i
j = 0,  for ri, r,s = 1,2,…,n 
This implies that only the constraints relative to Vi
s, s = 1,2,...,n, are relevant for an 
optimization problem of individual i – even though the others remain in the – equilibrium - 
background.
. For interior solutions of si
j and ri - 0 < si
j, ri < 1 -, the system would be completed with 
(m)i
j = 0, mi, m = 1,2,...,n, and ()i
j = 0. Due to (3.20), (3.7) – for interior solutions of xr
i for 
ri - implies ()i


















 = 0. We conclude that – if ui’(xi
i) cannot be zero 
in the relevant range for xi










  = 0. For an interior solution for xi
i (and some other 
xi
j), ri or sk
i for at least one of the other players must be zero – the conditions would be 
incompatible with interior solutions, or even sk
i = 1, for other players. 
. More interesting are the cases for which si
j = 1, ji, j = 1,2,...,n, and ri = 1, 
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  ,    l,m = 1,2,...,n  
(3.7) would hold, but with no added insights. We now have that the multipliers take a 
sort of canonical form, with (i
j)i
j taking the value 1, and all others 0. 









 = 0, imply: 
(3.26)   (j)i
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 = 0: 
(3.28) ()i























 )  =  ()i
i
The system applying to round j and player i – for given values of opponents’ strategies 
and his own at other rounds than j - is indeterminate. We claimed, that only contemporaneous 
(effective, i.e., other than those relative to the Vl
m’s) control conditions are restrictive – condition 14
(3.27) should therefore be superfluous; in fact, its addition just adds new unknowns - (s)i
j - and 
does not help (at this point…) in determination. 
. Mixed strategies with respect to ri, but pure ones with respect to si
j (with acceptance) 
si
j = 1, ji, j = 1,2,...,n, would add to (3.5) to (3.11), ()i
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(3.34) Vl






















 )  ,    l,m = 1,2,...,n 
(3.30) and (3.31) imply, at given rm’s and r’s, a system of n equations and n unknowns, 
the (l
m)i
j, l,m = 1,2,…,n. It solves – using (3.17), (3.15) and (3.20) - for: 
(3.35)    (i
j)i
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j =  0    ,   li, l,m = 1,2,…,n 
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j   ,  si, s = 1,2,…,n 
where (3.35) and (3.36) could be replaced.  
























and (3.34) holds. 
(3.39), replacing in the definition of Vi
i also requires: 
(3.40)   Vi








3.3. Nash Equilibrium 




ri from the various, nxn, problems.  
Multipliers are specific to each particular programme – and therefore they appeared 
indexed by (.)i
j.
. With pure strategies, (3.27) occurs at n-1 problems of each individual i. Then, it 
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j   ,   if   si,j,  s,i,j =1,2,….,n 




























)  =  ()i
i
Due to the structure of the equations, the system remains indeterminate. So one could 
expect that players affect each other’s multipliers to their own benefit and to the extent of their 
own ability within the game’s protocol. Also, even if condition (3.41) would normally be 
redundant, it should be observed – with non-negative multipliers in an optimum. One can assume 
that player i is going to force ()i
i up – maximizing his share, xi
i, according to condition (3.42) -, 
the multiplier associated with ri; and/or (s)l
i’s, l,si, l =1,2,…,n, to a minimum within its 
allowable range – i.e., i will press (s)l
i – the multipliers associated to the sl
m’s at round i, 
minimizing xl
i (for given policies of other players) - in all other player’s, l, problem i to zero. 
That is to say, decreases all others’ shares in xi – relative to his – but guaranteeing condition 




that measure the incremental welfare effect for player l at round i of his acquiescence ability at 
later settlements. Notice that forcing (s)l
i to zero in other players’ problems implies ()i
i being 
maximized and those conditions per se provide a corner that assures an interior equilibrium 
solution. 





























  ,    ji, i,j =1,2,….,n 
provide a full solution to the game. 
. With mixed strategies, the indeterminacy prevails. With the reasoning applied to (s)i
j
























     ji, i,j =1,2,….,n 
9
























   ,   i =1,2,….,n 
With (3.34) and (1.1) – or the equivalent restriction from all the problems -, equilibrium 
values for xi
j, Vi
j, and ri are obtainable. 
A solution can then be obtained with also the other definitions – exhibiting the properties 
stated in Martins (2006). 
. As long as ()i
i is (can be…) positive (di is very small compared to the n alternative 
equilibrium shares for player i) in pure strategies, a better solution should be attainable - pure 
strategies should always outperform mixed ones. 
4. Simultaneous Games 
4.1. The Player’s Problem 
. Assume an n-persons synchronized offers game.  
ri is the probability with which player i makes an offer at each round of negotiations, (1 - 
ri) the one with which he decides not to. One and only one offer is going to be heard; j’s offer will 






















 for each player i; or rejected with the game reinitiating next period with a delay 
involving losses di
j (that eventually differ according to the effectively offering, rejected, party) 
for player i – which therefore gets then pay-off di
j + i Vi, where Vi is the value of the game for 
player i.  








   at each round, i gets payoff 
di + i Vi – he obtains di in the period and bargaining re-initiates next period.
If more than one player make offers, the game re-starts with no delay – each player 
maintaining his expectations, Vi.
Each player i will solve the problem: 18
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    =  1
 x l
i 	 0, l = 1,2,...,n;
 0    
  ri 
  1;  0 
  si
m 
 1, mi, m = 1,2,...,n 
  Given     rm, mi,  m = 1,2,…,n;  
 x l
m, mi,  l,m = 1,2,…,n;
 s l
m, li,m,  l,m = 1,2,…,n. 
(4.3) can be simplified to: 
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  }    ,   l = 1,2,...,n 
4.2. First Order Conditions 
. Player i is going to face the lagrangean: 
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 (m)i (1 - si
m)
 x l
i 	 0, l = 1,2,...,n;
 ( )i 	 0; (l)i 	 0, l = 1,2,...,n 
 ( )i (1 - ri) = 0,  ri 	 0, ()i 	 0; 
 ( m)i (1 - si
m) = 0,  si
m 	 0, (m)i 	 0, mi, m = 1,2,...,n 
Then for optimal solutions with positive values of xi
j, si
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 = 0   ,   m = 1,2,...,n 



































  } = 0 , ri, r = 
1,2,…,n
will be zero. 
. For interior solutions of si
j and ri, the system would be completed with (m)i = 0, mi, 
m = 1,2,...,n, and ()i = 0. 
. Mixed strategies with respect to ri, but pure ones with respect to si
j (with acceptance) 
si
j = 1, ji, j = 1,2,...,n, would add to (4.6) to (4.12), ()i = 0: 


















































  ]  =  0 , (r)i = 0, ri, r = 1,2,…,n 






















    + 




































































  ]  + 

























































   di   =  0
and
































   dl] /  
























  ]   ,   l = 1,2,…,n 




















s ]  =
























  ]   ,  si, s = 1,2,…,n 










































  ]  = 22







































































































  -  di





























 +  di  ,   i = 1,2,…,n 
Subtracting both sides of (4.21) from those of (4.22): 






























. A Nash equilibrium will involve the coincidence of value solutions for Vi, xi
j, si
j, and ri
from the various, n, problems.  
Multipliers are specific to each particular programme – and therefore they appeared 










  =  di
s + i Vi ,    si, i,s = 1,2,…,n 
As (4.24) requires: 








     ,      i = 1,2,…,n 23
With (1.1) – or the equivalent from all the problems - a solution for the xi
j’s – and 


















  ,    mi, i,m = 1,2,…,n 












































i]  -  di , i = 1,2,…,n 
or
(4.29) ui(xi









   [di
m - ui(xi
i)]  ,    i = 1,2,…,n 
With xi
i’s, rm’s can be inferred from the last equation system – see Martins (2006). 
Conclusion
It was shown how different protocols of the bargaining over the distribution of an 
exogenously fixed asset can be mathematically programmed. On the one hand, the individuals’ 
problems, were adequately stated, as well as insufficiency of FOC to originate a solution. In 
alternate offers, the indeterminacy remained even with the introduction of intertemporal 
optimization restrictions. On the other, additional conditions qualifying the known solutions were 
introduced and rationalized.
One concluded that equilibrium determination in splitting games – at least in those 
inspected - can be adequately interpreted as the result of each individual’s choice, when he is 
deciding the own proposition, of the corner - guaranteeing non-negative multipliers of the 
acceptance probabilities of other players also towards other players’ offers - that is most 
advantageous to him over the optimal set provided by the standard FOC’s. In those games, such 
rule generated the possibility of a unique interior solution. 24
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